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Abstract 
The concept of international competitiveness accords a notion of highly competitive 
marketplace with countries, industries, and firms fiercely vying for dominance, market 
share, and profit. However, the arena of competition and competitive advantage is 
moving from individual operations towards supply chains using coordination 
mechanisms. In such an environment, competitive capacity for agricultural products, and 
sugar in particular, needs to be based on supply chain coordination and cooperation. As 
the world sugar industry is under intense pressure to deregulate and become competitive, 
the importance of co-operating increases. This paper aims at reinforcing the relation 
between cooperation and competitiveness by examining Australian sugar supply chain 
activities from the perspectives of transaction cost economics. It lays the groundwork in 
which various transaction costs in the supply chain can be segregated and assessed. The 
main conclusion is to develop relationship among chain members based on trust with a 
common goal for improving competitiveness. 
Keywords: Sugar, Supply Chain, Transaction Costs, Competitiveness, Australia. 
 
1.    Introduction 
Industries are facing increasing global competition caused by technological advances, 
diversity of product requirements, demanding customer expectations, and even by 
distortion in comparative costs and market shares through government supports and 
subsidies. 
In recent years, the Australian sugar industry has been confronted with increasingly 
critical circumstances, particularly reduced sugar yields and low profitability. Sugar 
Research and Development Corporation (SRDC), while taking note of such condition, 
observes that:  
This has been associated with a combination of adverse internal factors (e.g. 
supply problems caused by national hazards particularly high climatic variability 
and disease, and the rigidities of the current structure and culture of the industry) 
and external factors (e.g. the sharp downturn in world prices for sugar, changed 
relativities in world currency exchange rates, and disappointing returns on 
capital and low profitability throughout the industry value chain) (2003). 
 
In such a situation, it is increasingly important to understand how the management and 
coordination of supply chain can lead to improved industry efficiency, profitability, and 
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competitiveness. Principles of partnership and coordination along the supply chain to 
attain competitive position are of particular interest. More so, when Australian sugar 
industry exports around 80% of its sugar production. However, coordinating activities in 
a supply chain is difficult due, in part, to complexity in a large number of inter-dependent 
activities in a supply chain. 
Australian cane sugar supply chain activities can be analysed as expanded sets of 
contracts and is examined from the perspectives of transaction cost economics in this 
paper. This will help to identify possible transaction costs that induce inefficiencies and 
constrain competitiveness of the supply chain. 
Firms are subject to intense competitive pressures as global competition increases. This 
creates additional challenges for individual firms as well as along the supply chain of 
which they form a part (Lee, 2002). In such an uncertain global environment, 
competitiveness is sought and pursued through inter-firm relationships as enunciated by 
Nassimbeni (1998) and Zineldin and Jonsson (2000). The concept of competitiveness 
traditionally refers to the ability of a firm or a group of firms (as part of an inter-related 
system) to gain market share, in the international or domestic market. This is typically 
advanced by creating cost efficiencies throughout the inter-related chain of firms 
resulting in increasing returns to capital and labour.  
This notion of competitiveness related to efficiency and productivity is in accordance 
with Porter’s (1990) approach based on industrial organisation and costs. This concept of 
competitiveness is broadened here through the application of the transaction cost 
framework that ‘explicitly considers the efficiency implications of adopting alternate 
governance mechanisms’ (Heide, 1994). Such an analysis accounts for efficiency 
implications beyond firm boundaries and how these might be used organising 
relationships. In light of this, competitiveness becomes a function of a system’s 
performance, stability and value-added strategies. It is in this sense that the term 
competitiveness is used here. 
 
Supply Chain and Economics 
 
The concept of supply chain management (SCM) is build on the theories of the firm 
especially transaction cost economies. When combined with the seminal work of Porter’s 
value chain optimization, it provides a useful business paradigm (Wilson, 1996). 
 
  2.1  Supply Chain and SCM 
A number of definitions have been proposed concerning the concept of ‘the supply chain’ 
and its management. Lummus and Vorkurka (1999) reviewed definitions, the concept of 
the supply chain, and the evolution of supply chain management. They found that the 
interest in SCM has steadily increased when firms saw the benefits of collaborative 
relationships that transcend both functional boundaries (intrafirm) and organisational 
boundaries (interfirm). The authors further observed that the firms no longer compete 
effectively in isolation of their suppliers or other entities in the supply chain. 
Reinforcing the above concept, Mason-Jones and Towill (1997) state that to maximize 
competitive advantage, all members within the supply chain should ‘seamlessly’ work 
together. To add to this, Spekman, Kamauff, and Myhr (1998) observe that success no 
longer is a measure of a single transaction; competition, in many instances, is a function 
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of a network of co-operating companies competing with other firms along the entire 
supply chain. 
 
The definition of supply chain as provided by Beamon (1998) embodies the role of 
information systems in the traditional activities of moving goods (from raw material stage 
through to final consumer): 
‘A supply chain may be defined as an integrated process wherein a number of 
various business entities (i.e. suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, and retailers) 
work together in a effort to: (1) acquire raw materials, (2) convert these raw 
materials into specified final products, and (3) deliver these final products to 
retailers. This chain is traditionally characterized by a forward flow of materials 
and a backward flow of information’ (p. 281).  
 
Chandra and Kumar (2000) express that SCM has become a crucial element of improving 
competitiveness by reducing uncertainty and enhancing customer service.  
Novack and Simco (1991) succinctly define supply chain as consisting of ‘participants, 
or intermediaries, who are linked physically, behaviorally, and informationally, for the 
purpose of facilitating transactions among channel members’ (p. 146). 
For Wilson (1996), ‘SCM theory is concerned with the linkages in the chain from 
primary producer to final consumer with the incentive of reducing the transaction costs 
incurred within. It seeks to breakdown barriers between each of the units so as to achieve 
higher levels of service and substantial savings in costs’ (p. 9). 
The traditional view of SCM is to leverage the supply chain to achieve the lowest 
procurement price while assuring supply. Such traditional supply chain comprises 
independent channel partners who do not plan cooperatively nor share information. 
Typical characteristics include multiple partners, partner evaluation based on purchase 
price, arms-length negotiations, formal short-term contracts, and centralized purchasing 
(Spekman et.al., 1998). These conditions lead to fierce competition among suppliers with 
performance being the only measure for long-term cooperation. Such an environment is 
based on two fundamental notions of: 
(1) Competition, through market mechanism, promotes intense rivalry for an 
efficient and healthy supply base; 
(2) Trading partners can be altered when necessary. 
 
Therefore, in traditional SCM view, suppliers and partners are frequently selected based 
primarily on cost, ease of doing business, and in the process, the extent to which they can 
be relied upon. 
Under the new paradigm, where focus of competition shifts from firm versus firm to 
chain (or system) versus chain, firms within a system can be better of by ensuring the 
sustainability of a supply chain by fair distribution of costs and benefits among the 
participants by working together or co-operating. In such a situation, one of the key 
elements of SCM is the notion of ‘co-operating to compete’ (O’Keeffe, 1998). 
In developing supply chain strategies, Morash (2001) identifies two major classes: 
operational excellence and customer closeness. Companies pursuing ‘operational 
excellence’, seek ways to minimize costs, reduce transaction and other ‘friction’ costs 
(Treacy and Wiersema, 1993). ‘Customer closeness’ is characterised by value-added 
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customer service, quality product, and problem recovery to satisfy customers (Morash, 
2001). Now, developing a supply chain strategy to operate effectively, it is not only 
necessary to be aware of customer needs and potential benefits of chain formation, but 
also build relationships based on trust. This reduces the cost of doing business and 
increases flexibility. 
Today, SCM represents a paradigm of the concepts of ‘co-operation and competition’ 
(O’Keeffe, 1998) and successful chains have a culture of continuous improvement 
combined with process to ensure quality and optimization. 
 
2.2        Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
 
TCE pertains to the co-existence of different forms of organizations and mechanisms for 
co-ordinating economic transactions: firms, markets, and hybrid forms of governance of 
exchange relations. It ‘emerged as a reaction to the neoclassical theory of the firm which 
ignored the friction inherent in transactions’ (Wilson, 1996). The seminal work of Coase 
(1937) identified this limitation of the neoclassical paradigm. 
Williamson (1985, 1991) has since developed Coase’s original insights to draw together 
the core concepts of “transaction cost” in TCE. Williamson reasoned that bounded 
rationality and opportunism are characteristic of human behavior and, when incorporated 
with informational asymmetry and asset specificity, result in transactions costs. Wilson 
(1996) referring to Cheung (1992), classifies these dimensions as ‘a spectrum of 
institutional costs’ including those of information, negotiation, and monitoring 
(enforcement) costs. 
Loader (1997, p. 25) adds that Williamson (1979) further distinguishes between: 
 ‘Frequency’ (volume/number of transactions per time period) as the ‘cost-
determining attributes of individual transactions’, and  
 ‘Uncertainty’ as the ‘environmental, political, social or economic risk’ related to 
transactions. 
 
These additional characteristics lead to costs in carrying out transactions. 
The human characteristics encompass all informational activities that influence 
transaction costs within a supply network and on the efficiency (minimization of 
transaction costs) of alternative transaction modes. Therefore, simply stated, transaction 
costs are the costs of gathering information prior to a transaction, negotiating the actions 
of carrying out the exchange, and monitoring enforcement to ensure that pre-arranged 
terms of the transaction are adhered to (Boger, Hobbs & Kerr, 2001). Coase (1937) 
opines that these costs are an incentive to integration, either through cooperation or by 
buyout of chain partners. 
 
Further, Boger, Hobbs & Kerr (2001) state that prohibitively high transaction costs will 
stifle economic exchange, deter investment and impede the transition process. 
Transaction costs are, therefore, considered as one of the main motives for interaction, 
co-operation, co-ordination and collaboration to alleviate the uncertainty of the market, 
reduce risks, and to increase the efficiency of economic exchange. Heide (1994) also 
emphasized the need ‘for establishing and managing channel relationships’ especially 
where mutual dependence of firms involved in transactions is acknowledged. Mentzer 
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(1993) states that ‘from a channel relationship perspective, the long term relational 
orientation and the limited supplier decisions tend to make the channels more 
strategically oriented and relationships more cooperative than conflictual’(p. 32). 
In the objective to achieve reduced transaction costs, Wilson (1996) also endorses the 
establishment of ‘a lasting relationship based on trust’ among players to ‘ “synergize their 
strengths” to improve the supply and development of the market’ (p. 29). This precludes 
the need for contracts and expensive negotiation. Batt (2003), while citing Hawes, Mart, 
and Swan (1989), states that ‘for any particular potential exchange, trust will be critical if 
two situational factors are present: risk and incomplete buyer information’ (p.66).  
In addition to trust for the establishment of successful long-term relationships, 
commitment is also recognized as an essential ingredient (Gundlach, Achrol, Mentzer, 
1995). They further write that: 
 
Committed partners are willing to invest in valuable assets specific to an exchange, 
demonstrating that they can be relied upon to perform essential functions in the 
future (Anderson & Weitz, 1992). These self-interest stakes help stabilize 
associations, alleviating the uncertainty and cost of continually seeking and 
consummating new exchanges (p.78).  
 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) drawing on The Commitment-Trust Theory mention that ‘when  
both commitment and trust – not just one or the other – are present, they produce 
outcomes that promote efficiency, productivity and effectiveness’ (p.22).  
It is therefore seen that reducing transaction costs is the objective of an economic 
exchange. This can be achieved by building long-term ‘channel relationships’ based on 
trust and commitment. There will be transparency and openness among the chain 
members, resist attractive short-term alternatives in favor of the long-term benefits, and 
reduce uncertainty.  Such conditions of cooperative behaviors will result in awareness, 
trust, efficiency, transparency and rewards. 
 
2. Supply Chain and Transaction Costs  
 
Supply chain management (SCM) is built on a foundation of trust and commitment (Lee 
and Billington, 1992). It is seen in its basic form as a move towards co-operation in 
building a long-term relationship. ‘These long-term relationship lead to reduced political 
social or economic risk, reduced transaction costs, and access to economies of scale by 
by-passing traditional market arrangements’ (Loader, 1997; p.22). 
 
3.1  Transaction Cost Basis 
 
McAdam and McCormack (2001) highlight that as supply chains develop, complexity 
increases with: 
 Increase in the number of linkages to be managed; 
 Difficulty in the communication of a common goals; and 
 Increase dependency on each other among the chain members. 
Echoing similar concerns, Loader (1997) referring to Hakansson (1982) notes that 
‘exchange relations are not always co-operative, and therefore the notion of rationalizing 
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and economizing on transaction costs in the comparison of the different modes of 
organization becomes crucial’ (p.25). Following Williamson (1985), an efficient 
alignment of the governance mode and the characteristics of the transactions are expected 
to exist. In the context of the above, it is imperative to understand the (1) Contracting 
Process and (2) Governance. 
 
(1) Contracting Process 
 
In the words of Williamson (1985, p. 30),  
The world of contract is variously described as one of (1) planning, (2) promise, 
(3) competition, and (4) governance (or private ordering). Which of these 
descriptions is most applicable depends on the behavioral assumptions that 
pertain to an exchange and on the economic attributes of the good or service in 
question.  
 
The key concepts of TCE that underpin the contracting process are uncertainty, bounded 
rationality, opportunism, and asset specificity. 
(i) ‘Uncertainty’ in various degrees is present in any economic exchange. This 
contributes to costs in carrying out transactions.  
(ii) ‘Bounded rationality’ acknowledge limited judgements of individuals. This means 
that though the individuals may try to act rationally, they may be partially 
successful in realizing their intentions.  
(iii) ‘Opportunism’ is defined by Williamson (1985, p. 47) as ‘self-interest seeking 
with guile’. This recognizes individuals to behave opportunistically to exploit a 
situation to their own advantage.  
(iv) ‘Asset specificity’ signifies investment characteristics and denotes dedicated 
inputs. 
 
Williamson (1985) writes that the ‘most critical dimension for describing transactions is 
the condition of asset specificity’. Lyons (1994) while stating that ‘modern transaction 
cost theory is predicted on two key behavioral assumptions, opportunism and bounded 
rationality’, maintains that the transaction cost theory ‘is made operational by the central 
role given to asset specificity’ (p.314). 
These characteristics also have a major influence on the efficiency of alternative 
transaction modes. 
 
 
 
 
In the context of the above dimensions, the variances in contract processes are presented 
in Table 1. The table suggests the following implications: 
(1) When a situation arises where bounded rationality is absent, that is, full rational 
judgment is assumed with dedicated inputs and opportunistic parties, then the 
contractual process becomes one of rational and cognitive planning. In such situation, 
contract between parties is accurate and effective and based on full and informed 
account of all possibilities. 
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Table 1 Attributes of the Contracting Process 
 
 Behavioral Assumption      Implied Contracting 
________________________________     Process 
   Bounded      Opportunism  Asset 
   Rationality     Specificity 
 
 0   +       +   Rational & cognitive  
planning – taking an 
educated account of all 
relevant issues & 
potential problems. 
 
 +   0       +   Promise – based on  
complete trust & 
   honesty of parties  
   leading to self-    
enforcement for mutual 
benefit. 
 
 +   +       0   Competition – in the 
          market will overcome 
         problems 
 
 +   +       +   Governance –  
         internalization of  
         contracting 
Notes: + denotes presence in significant degree; 0 denotes absence 
Source: Adapted from Williamson (1985) and Loader (1997). 
 
 
(2) When opportunism is absent, and parties need to base their judgements on limited 
information with assets dedicated to the specific transaction, then the contracting 
process is based on promise that is a result of trust between them and makes the 
contract self enforcing. 
(3) When asset specificity is absent, that is, the input can be freely selected with 
opportunistic self-interest and limited judgement being present, then the contracting 
process is in the realm of competition where the market decides.  In this situation 
neither parties are interested about each other or on establishing any relationship. 
(4) This is a situation where conditions of limited judgement, opportunistic self-interest, 
and dedicated inputs are present at the same time. In a case like this rational and 
cognitive planning is not effective, promise does not hold, and competition does not 
persist due to dedicated inputs. This results in internalization of the contract process 
where internal governance holds. 
 
(2)  Governance 
 
TCE acknowledges that variation in the contractual process is mainly explained by 
underlying differences in the attributes of transactions and ‘that each generic form of 
governance…needs to be supported by a different form of contract law’ (Williamson, 
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1991; p. 271). There are three main types: classical contract, neoclassical contract, and 
relational contract. 
 Classical Contract: Classical contract law endeavors to implement discreteness and 
applies to the ideal transaction in law and economics…in which the identity of the 
parties is irrelevant. Classical contract law is congruent with and supports the 
autonomous market form of organization. The emphasis is on legal rules, formal 
documents, and self-liquidating transactions (Williamson 1985, p. 69; Williamson 
1991, p. 271). 
 Neoclassical Contract: Neoclassical contract law, which relieves parties from strict 
enforcement, applies to contracts in which the parties to the transaction maintain 
autonomy but are bilaterally dependent to a nontrivial degree. A recognition that the 
world is complex, the agreements are incomplete, and that some contracts will never 
be reached unless both parties have confidence in the settlement machinery thus 
characterizes neoclassical contract law (Williamson 1985, p. 70; Williamson 1991; 
pp. 271-272). 
 Relational Contract: ‘Continuing contract between the parties where a range of 
social and economic relationships help to define and support a range of transactions’ 
(Loader, 1997, p. 26).  
 
To successfully accomplish transactions, the structure for efficient governance regarding 
the volume and recurrence of transactions and investment characteristics is depicted in 
Table 2. It is seen that standardized nature of transaction stems from classical contracting 
and implies market governance. In this, alternatives to opportunistic self-interest behavior 
are available from the market. 
Trilateral governance (in Table 2) implies that contracts stipulates arbitration as a 
settlement mechanism in case of disputes and also employs performance evaluation. 
Continuing contractual contract is the characteristic of bilateral governance where 
autonomy of both parties is maintained.  Unified governance implies internalization of 
the contracting process.  
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Table 2: Efficient governance structure based on principal dimensions of transactions 
Nature of  Frequency  Asset  Type of       Expected 
Transaction     Specificity Contracting      Governance 
               Structure 
 
Standardized  Occasional  Non-Specific Classical      Marketa 
   & Recurring    Contracting 
 
Non-   Occasional  Mixed & Neo-Classical     Trilateralb 
Standardized     Highly  Contracting 
      Specific 
 
Non-   Recurring  Mixed & Relational      Bilateralc/ 
Standardized     Highly  Contracting      Unifiedd 
      Specific 
Source: Adapted from Williamson (1985) and Loader (1997). 
 
 
Notes: 
a Alternatives are available (from the market) which can be used if dishonesty persists and  
protect each party against opportunism by his opposite. 
b  Contracts are built with safeguards and third-party assistance (arbitration) in resolving disputes 
and evaluating performance is employed. 
c  Bilateral governance implies continuing contractual contract, but with the autonomy of the 
parties maintained. 
d   Unified governance implies internalization of the contracting process. 
 
4.  Transaction Cost, Sugar, & Supply Chain 
 
The factors that make for an integrated approach as applicable in the food supply chains 
involve complex issues such as perishability, transportation of low value products, and 
increasing consumer demands for safety (Hobbs, 1996;Folkerts and Koehorst, 1997). 
This is also applicable in the sugar industry. The chain can achieve integration through 
joint strategic planning by all participants working together through open and transparent 
sharing of information based on mutual trust and respect.  
In search of efficiencies in the Australian sugar industry, Dr Muchow (2000) has referred 
to ‘exploiting linkages and interdependencies across the farming, milling, and marketing 
sectors’ with the ‘shared ownership of local issues’ and ‘a commitment to proceed on a 
partnership basis’. He has further stressed on the fact that integration of the growing, 
harvesting and transport, and milling sectors is complex, but essential, to assess the 
benefits and costs of different cane supply scenarios. 
Milford (2002) observes that there has been recognition in the sugar industry of Australia, 
almost since the inception, for the need for some form of chain management. This is 
primarily ‘due to the highly integrated nature of the chain and the potential for adverse 
power relationships within it’. He further notes that, in Australia, 
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the sugar industry supply chain has been managed in the past through legislation. 
…This mediated the power relationships, obviated the need to develop other 
forms of relationship and led to the establishment of strong sectoral 
representative bodies and linkages (pp. i &2). 
 
In this context, the effects of some of the elements of transaction cost, for developing 
closer partnerships in the Australian sugar industry, are considered below. 
 
4.1  Reducing Transaction Costs 
In an attempt to reduce transaction costs Milford (2002), referring to Chapman, Milford, 
and Burrows (1997), provides some examples of transaction costs in the sugar industry. 
They include: 
 The costs of miller—grower negotiations – that is preparation, meetings, grower 
feedback meetings, expert assistance, mediation and arbitration, technical and 
negotiation support; 
 The costs of compliance with industry regulations – e.g. applying for cane production 
area; 
 The costs that arise because of asymmetric information – that is seeking information 
known to the other side, mistakes made due to lack of knowledge; 
 The cost of entering into a harvesting arrangement and uncertainty arising due to any 
change in the arrangements. 
 
The transaction costs can be reduced with the development of an integrated supply chain 
where trust is generated and strategic aims are aligned to replace contracts and 
negotiations (as seen in Table 1). This creates a situation where there is a better flow of 
information between parties concerned that reinforces the trust and commitment to the 
exchange. The supply chain becomes more efficient as time spent on negotiation is 
replaced with time spent in rational and cognitive planning. This allows the development 
of strategies to create more income by reducing costs (Hobbs, 1996). It is to be 
acknowledged that building relationships takes effort and also entails transaction costs. 
 
4.2  A Typical Application to Sugar 
 
In taking into consideration Williamson’s elements of transactions along with the 
expected governance structure, an attempt is made to disaggregrate the nature of 
transaction into a series of components to explore the relationships between cane growers 
(farmers growing the crop for the mills and the export market) and mill-owners.  
The basic profit center of the industry is the mill area where the marketable raw sugar 
product results from the joint efforts of both the farmers and the millers and can be 
depicted as: 
Profit Centre = mill area = farms + (harvest + transport) + factory (Hildebrand, 2002). 
Similarly, the basic supply chain of sugar can be depicted as: 
FARM  → HARVESTING → TRANSPORT → MILL → TRANSPORT & 
STORAGE → REFINING → INTERMEDIATES & END USERS 
The Farm Mill Relationship 
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Sugarcane once cut must be treated within 16 hours otherwise its sweetness and its 
commercial value deteriorates. For this reason, farms and mill must be geographically 
located and the farmer and the mill are wholly co-dependent. In the light of the above, the 
transaction objectives of the farmers and the mills, as borrowed from Hildebrand Report 
(2002), can be summarized as: 
¾ ‘Farmers seek to ensure that a mill will accept the cane they will grow and harvest 
over the season for optimum farm proceeds, to a schedule that averages crop and 
climate event risks between farmers; and 
¾ On the other hand, a mill seeks to ensure that cane farming is the most profitable use 
of land in its feeder area, and that its milling capacity is adequate to ensure cane 
continues to be grown in sufficient quantity by its supplying farmers, in order for the 
mill to remain economically viable’. 
 
These respective objectives of the farmers and the mill owners seek to maximize their 
own performance. It also implies that the desirability of pursuing closer integration across 
these inter-dependent partners through joint planning, trust, and respect is of mutual 
benefit. However, it appears that the farmers and the mill owners lack the desired 
characteristics in their relationship and operate in an environment of high uncertainty. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate clearly the relationships between the farmers (the cane growers) 
and the mill-owners (the cane users) in respect to the dimensions of transactions cost 
developed in Tables 1 and 2. 
The implications that can be drawn from the analysis of the tables are: 
¾ The transactions require extensive dedicated inputs including the location-specific 
nature of the investments and the temporal specificities associated with the 
perishability of the agricultural product (sugarcane). The nature of the transactions 
results in advantages to firms in specialization and/or integration. As specialized or 
relationship specific investments increase, coordinated adaptation becomes more 
important. 
¾ There is high degree of uncertainty in transactions and it is imperative to steady the 
relationships through commitment and trust as millers and farmers are jointly reliant 
in each mill area for profitable outcomes.  
¾ Bounded rationality exists which also enhances the political, social or economic risks 
leading to the breaking down of planning processes which results in a need for greater 
co-operation. Public education of farmers can reduce some of the sources of 
uncertainty and help create an environment of commitment and trust for economic 
sustainability of mill area. 
¾ The transactions are high during crushing season and other times relatively 
infrequent, then they are more likely then such transactions are more likely to be 
handled by some form of specialized governance structure. Williamson (1985) notes 
that ‘where frequency is low but the needs for nuanced governance are great, the 
possibility of aggregating the demands of similar but independent transactions is 
suggested’.  
¾ Further, to reduce opportunistic self-interest, rules and standards are to be drawn. 
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Table 3: Cane growers to Mill-owners  
 
(1) Contractual Perspective  From Cane growers  To Mill-owners 
 
      Transaction objectives  To supply quality sugarcane to mills. 
 
(2)  Nature of Transaction 
        
       Volume/number of transaction Relatively infrequent – bulk supplies. 
 (frequency)          
       Environmental, Political, social Considerable being an agricultural product; problems of  
       or economic risk (uncertainty) yield, seasonality, unpredictability and demands of mills.         
        Dedicated inputs (asset  High – human assets considerable. 
        specificity)              
        Limited judgement (bounded High – with little knowledge of prices and qualities -  
        rationality)    lack of education of farmers, etc.          
       Opportunistic behaviour (self Considerable – mill-owners wield ultimate power.   
         interest & guile)  
 
(3) Governance 
¾ Actual   Trilateral – contracts are built with safeguards and  
identified arbitration to schedule harvesting & to ensure 
acceptance of cane. 
¾ Expected   Relational/bilateral seeks continuity of contract and      
                                                     reduce transactions costs as useful time can be utilized   
                                                     for joint planning & strategies 
 
(4)  Contracting Process  Neo-classical with a maximizing orientation. 
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Table 4: Mill-owners to Cane growers  
 
(1) Contractual Perspective  From Mill-owners  To Cane growners 
 
      Transaction objectives  To obtain reliable, timely and high quality sugarcane 
 
(2)  Nature of Transaction 
 
       Volume/number of transaction High – in season 
 (frequency) 
 
        Environmental, Political, social  Considerable being an agricultural product; problems of 
        or economic Risk (uncertainty) yield and unpredictability. 
 
        Dedicated inputs (asset  High – substantial investment in physical assets and  
        specificity)    human skills. 
 
        Limited judgement (bounded Low 
        rationality) 
 
        Opportunistic behaviour (self Moderate – mill-owners wield too much power for this   
interest & guile)  to be a major problem to them. 
 
(4) Governance 
¾ Actual   Trilateral – contracts are built with safeguards and  
                                                                  identified arbitration to continue supply in a timely and   
                                                                  efficient manner. 
¾ Expected   Relational/bilateral 
 
(4)  Contracting Process  Neo-classical with maximizing orientation.  
Source: Adapted from Loader (1997) 
 
 
In analysisng the current operational environment, the sugar industry is characterised by: 
 A distinct lack of trust – with opportunism being potentially present in some 
cases; 
 A fiercely competitive global market for sugar with perhaps increasing 
uncertainty; 
 A deeply-rooted tradition of independence among the cane-growers; 
 Unequal power relationships (as exhibited in Table 3 and 4) that is ‘critical in the 
perception of trust’ (Young and Wilkinson, 1989). 
For example, growers who can access two mills will have different opportunities for 
opportunism than those who can access only one. Also company owned mills and 
cooperatively owned ones will have different opportunities due to their different 
ownership and organisational structures. Either side may seek opportunities in time 
sensitive practices such as cane harnessing and transport. Such factors are major hurdles 
in the pursuit of greater co-operation, co-ordination and collaboration. 
Opportunism is one of the key behavioural variables driving transaction costs analysis. 
Morgan and Hunt (1994, p. 25; quoting John, 1984) state that ‘the essence of 
opportunistic behavior is deceit-oriented violation of implicit or explicit promises about 
one’s appropriate or required role behavior’. Further, incorporating the suggestion of 
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Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987) that integrating trust in models of distribution channel 
relationships ‘provides a unique vantage point for treating opportunism as an explanatory 
variable’, Morgan and Hunt (1994) posit that opportunistic behaviour by one party will 
lead to decreased trust and relationship commitment. It is in this notion of opportunistic 
behaviour inhibiting trust and commitment that is expressed here. Such things can reduce 
competitiveness.  
In an environment of uncertainty and intense competitive and economic pressure in the 
world sugar market, the choices are extremely limited for all members of the sugar 
supply chain.  This calls for creating ‘negotiated environment’ (Heide, 1994, quoting 
Cyert and March, 1963) to enhance competitiveness. The nature and distribution of 
benefits associated with such an arrangement are: 
 A better system’s performance – through improved market access and higher 
profit margins; 
 Higher stability – through greater discipline; 
 More value-added strategies – through improved communications. 
Again, in the current Australian context, it may be argued that unequal power among the 
supply chain members and independence among the canegrowers inhibit trust building 
for a ‘negotiated environment’ and encourage opportunistic behaviour. This, to some 
extent may be true, but the long-term objectives and benefits should be the driving force 
for establishing and reinforcing the relationships among supply chain members. This is a 
situation to which all members should aspire and for which suitable note should be taken 
of the nature of transactions. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper attempts to lay the groundwork by discussing ways in which the implications 
of transactions cost in sugar can be assessed. This is done by setting out some of the 
issues involved in isolating transactions cost in independent activities (such as in a farm-
mill relation). The transaction tables venture to analyze the processes at work in the 
system. The framework advanced here constitutes both a basic portrayal of the system 
and an examination of the relationship of the main actors within it. 
In the case of this system the farmers and the mill-owners operate in an uncertain 
environment arising from an unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding an 
exchange and depending to some extent on the direction and nature of the relationships 
involved. The uncertainty combined with the extent of asset specificity drives the system 
towards vertical integration. It can be anticipated that such transition process will persist, 
unless uncertainty and bounded rationality are mitigated through advancement in 
information sharing between contracting parties towards cultivating trust and 
commitment. 
A successful chain will have the most efficient and effective structure to achieve 
customers’ need, improved efficiency, and international competitiveness. This could be 
one common goal of developing relationships. This is primarily dependent on joint 
planning and cognitive knowledge of each partner’s activities. In achieving such a 
relationship between partners, each has to commit to the exchange process based on trust. 
Ultimately such activities will lead to reduced transactions cost within the chain with 
rewards of efficiency and profitability for everyone in the supply chain. 
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